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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

gation based upon evidence,'1 2 to declare that in its opinion repression
was both desirable and necessary of groups of all kinds-whether
workingmen or non-workingmen-which advocate force for the accomplishment of their objects; and whatever arguments of uhdesirmust be
ability or unsoundness are raised by .doubting Thomases
3
addressed to their constituents and not to the courts.
Such is the viewpoint of the majority opinion in the instant case,
which is has consistently maintained in analogous cases which have
come before it in the past.' 4 From a constitutional standpoint, the con-

clusions reached seem impregnable; with reference to the desirability
of such legislation, opinions will differ. But the strong urge of the
present seems to be the sacrifice of many rights once regarded as
fundamental in the paramount interest of sound government, or, in
the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "exalting order at the cost of
liberty."
E. F. ALBERTSWORTH.
EVIDENCE-RULES GOVERNING COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES IN

CRIMINAL TRIALS

IN THE

FEDERAL CouRT.-[Federal]

The lack

of a satisfactory statute on the subject has led to more or less
doubt as to the precise rules governing the admissibility of evidence and the competency of witnesses in criminal prosecutions in
the federal courts, and a questionable opinion by the Supreme
12. Wiginore "The Abrams Case" 14 ILLINOIs LAW REvIEW 539; People
v. Lloyd (1922) 304 Ill. 23, 136 N. E. 505; People v. Ruthenberq (1924) 229
Mich. 315, 210 N. W. 358. In Gitlow v. New York, Mr. Justice Sanford
said: "A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for
a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be
said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise
of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and
safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled
the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required
to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency." 45
Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, 631.
13. The dissenting justices, by insisting that the statute cannot be constitutional unless construed to mean the presence of an imminent, serious,
real danger to the State, appear to bd doing that which they strongly criticized in the majority when the latter overthrew the minimum wage act of the
District of Columbia in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S.525,
43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785-namely, postulating an "inarticulate
major premise" in order to achieve a certain conclusion desired by them, and
thus holding the statute unconstitutional.
14. See cases cited, supra. note 6. It is, of course, well established that
great weight must be given by the courts to the declaration of a state legislature of the urgency and wisdom of the statute as a means to reach the result
contemplated. Unless the statute is "clearly and palpably" unreasonable or
arbitrary, the sound principle has been to uphold the legislation under judicial
scrutiny. Necessarily, conclusive finality could not be sanctioned, for this
would enable the state to set itself above the inhibitions of the federal Constitution. Tested by these well-settled criteria, the dissenting justices seem to
be departing into "heretical" fields. Consult Warren "Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court" ch. 9.
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Court' a few years ago increased the uncertainty. A recent decision 2 by the circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit raises
the question, whether the rules are uniform throughout the United
States, or whether they vary according to the law of the particular
state, in which the federal court functions, as the state rule happened to be at the time of the passage of the judiciary act in 1789,
or at the time of the subsequent admission of the state. At common law one spouse was incompetent as a witness for the other,
and at the time of the passage of the judiciary act that disability
had not been removed in any of the states. Subsequent legislation in most of the states has qualified husband and wife as witnesses
for each other in criminal cases, but there is no corresponding
federal statute.3 'Accordingly in criminal prosecutions in the federal courts sitting in various states there has been a uniform line
of decisions that the husband or wife of, the defendant was not
a competent witness. 4
In the Rendlemacn case the district court.excluded the wife
of the defendant in accordance with what was assumed to be the
general federal rule.The court of appeals reversed the case on the ground that
the competency was to be determined by the law of the State of
Washington at the time of its admission as a state, and that it
appeared that prior to that time the territorial legislature had removed the common law disqualification.
The same court had reached a similar conclusion in an earlier
case 5 involving the competency of an atheist. And in the fifth
circuit the majority opinion6 took the same view in a case involving the competency of a witness who had been convicted of a
felony, where that disability had been removed prior to the admission of the state. According to the view of these cases, the
husband or wife of a defendant is incompetent in a criminal prosecution in a federal court sitting in one of the older states where
the common law disqualifications had not been removed in 1789,
but is competent where the court sits in one of the newer states
where modem legislation had taken place prior to its admission
to the Union. It is somewhat shocking to think that in a prosecution for a violation of a criminal statute of the United States,
one defendant should stand in a worse position than another because the federal court in which he is tried sits in one of the older
states. This precise question has not been passed on by the Su1. Rosen v. United States (1918) 245 U. S. 467.
2. Rendlenzan v. United States (1927) 18 Fed. (2nd) 27.

3. The act of March 3, 1887, qualified the husband or wife of the

defendant in prosecutions for bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful co-habitation.
4. Hendrix v. United States (1910) 219 U. S. 79; Jin Fuey Moy v.
United States (1920) 254 U. S. 189; Lowe v. United States (1922) 282 Fed.
597; Kraskowitz v. United States (1922) 282 Fed. 599; Allen v. United
States (1924) 4 Fed. (2nd) 688.
5. Ding v. United States (1918) 247 Fed. 12.
6. McCoy v. United States (1918) 247 Fed. 861.
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preme Court. It is important therefore to consider whether its
decisions on related questions necessarily lead to this unfortunate
lack of uniformity.
The general question as to what rules of evidence were to
be applied in criminal prosecutions in the federal courts first came
before the Supreme Court in the Reid case 7 in 1851. Reid and
Clements had been jointly indicted in the United States circuit
court for the district of Virginia for the crime of murder on the
high seas committed on an American ship. Reid was tried separately, and called his co-indictee as a witness, insisting on his
competency under a statute of Virginia passed in 1848, and that
section 8 of the judiciary-act of 1789, providing that the laws of
the several states, except as otherwise provided, should be the rules
of decision in trials at common law in the federal courts.
The trial court excluded the witness, but certified the question to the Supreme Court as authorized by statute. It should be
noticed that it was not suggested or contended that a co-indictee
was a competent witness for the defendant unless the Virginia
statute of 1848 was applicable to a criminal trial in a federal court.
The applicability of the Virginia statute, passed long after the
judiciary act, was the all important question under consideration.
The opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, answered
the question in the negative, that the section thirty-four of the
judiciary act was limited to civil cases, because it could not be
assumed that Congress intended to subject federal criminal prosecutions to varying and changing state rules, and hence that the
incompetency of the witness was not affected by the subsequent
Virginia statute.
But if subsequent state legislation was not to govern, the court
felt that it was necessary to indicate what rules shbuld be applied,
and the greater part of the opinion is taken up with-that problem.
On this subject the opinion states:
"Neither could the court look altogether to the rules of the English common law, as it existed at the time of the settlement of this
7. United States v. Reid (1851) 12 How. 361. Until quite modern
times few criminal cases came before the Supreme Court since the statute
did not provide for review by writs of error. United States v. Gooding

(1827) 12 Wheat. 460.

In the few cases where a question of evidence was certified prior to the
Reid case, it seems to have been assumed without question that the common
law governed. In the Gooding case, the question certified involved the
admissibility of a statement by the defendant's agent.
In United States v. Murphy (1842) 16 Pet. 203, the competency of the
informer was certified and sustained on the basis of the English decisions.
8. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 34, now Rev. Sts. sec. 721:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."

22 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

country, for rehsons that will presently be stated.9 Nor is there any
act of Congress prescribing in express words the rule by which the
courts of the United States are to be governed, in the admission of testimony in criminal cases. But we think they may be found with sufficient certainty, not indeed in direct terms, but by necessary implication,
in the acts of 1789 and 1790, establishing the courts of the United
States, and providing for the punishment of certain offenses. And the
law by which, in the opinion of this court, the admissibility of testimony
in criminal cases must be determined, is the law of the state, as it was
when the courts of the United States were established by the judiciary
act of 1789. 4 . .
"The only known rule upon the subject which cat be supposed to
have been in the minds of the men who framed these acts of Congress,
was that which was then in force in the respective states, and which
they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in the state
courts.

.

.

"But no law of a state made since 1789 can affect the mode of proceeding or the rules of evidence in criminal cases; and the testimony of
Clements was therefore, properly rejected."
The case is clear and certain on the primary problem, that
subsequent state legislation was not applicable. The implications
as to the prior law of the state will be noticed later.
The Logan case,"0 decided in 1892, raised a similar question
in a criminal prosecution in a federal court sitting in the State
of Texas.
The trial court admitted two witnesses on behalf of the
prosecution, one of whom had been convicted of a felony in the
court of another state, and the other by a Texas court. The
Texas felon had received a general pardon. The Republic of
Texas had adopted the common law in general terms. The legislature of the State of Texas had subsequently passed a statute
disqualifying persons convicted of felony by the courts of any
state, unless they had received a pardon expressly removing all
disabilities.
In 1862, 1864 and 1865, Congress had passed several evidence
acts which had been consolidated into section 85811 of the revised
statutes, providing that no witness should be excluded in any
action on account of dolor, nor in any civil action because he
was a party; and that in all other respects the laws of the state
in which the court was held should be the rules of decision as
to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States
in trials at common law, and in equity and admiralty.
It is to be noted that the two witnesses objected to were
clearly competent at common law, the one because a foreign con9. The reasons pointed out in the opinion foe' this limitation were certain English abuses in criminal trials in the early part of the seventeenth
century, which had been guarded against in the bill of rights in the various
state constitutions, and hence it could not be supposed that Congress intended
to perpetuate certain objectionable practices, which had long since disappeared.
10. Logan v. United States (1892) 144 U. S. 263.
11. Now repealed.
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viction had no extra-territorial effect, and the other because he
had received a general pardon, and hence the defendant in his
assignment of error was forced to rely on the subsequent Texas
statute which he claimed was made applicable by that clause of
section 858 of the revised statutes making the state law govern
in trials at common law, etc.
The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Reid case
limiting a similar provision of the judiciary act to civil cases,
and accordingly held that the witnesses were not disqualified by
the Texas statute:
"For the reasons above stated, the provisions of section 858 of the
revised statutes, that the laws of the state in which the court is held
shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the
courts of the United States in trials at common law, and in equity and
admiralty, have no application to criminal trials; and, therefore, the
competency of witnesses in criminal trials irn the courts of the United
States held within the State of Texas is not governed by a statute of
the state which was first enacted in 1858, but, except so far- as Congress has made specific provisions upon the subject, is governed by the
common law, which as has been seen, was the law of Texas before the
passage of that statut and at the time of the admission of Texas into
the Union, as a State."
This concluding recital of the fact that the common law was
in force in Texas at the time of its admission as a state furnishes
the basis for the assumption by the circuit court of appeals that
it was because the common law was in force in Texas when admitted to statehood that the federal court was to apply the common law, and for the same reason, since a statute was in force
in Washington at the time of its admission, the federal court
was bound to apply the statute. The whole contention of the defendant in the Logan case, as in the Reid case, was that the court
was bound to apply a subsequent state statute because a federal
statute apparently so declared. If that contention failed, there
was no dispute on the proposition that it must be governed by
the common law, but whether because Texas had adopted the common law or because the judiciary act had impliedly adopted the
common law was of no particular importance in that case.
H-ence a casual statement in the Logan case furnished an extremely slender basis for the determination of such a question
when it did become important.
The same year the Benson case1 2 came before the court, and
has been said to overturn the Reid case, though how it does so
is difficult to see since it was assumed by court and counsel that
the competency of the witness in that case was governed by the
common law.
The defendant was indicted and tried in the United States
circuit court for the district of Kansas for murder committed
'on the Fort Leavenworth military reservation. Whether the com12. Benson v. United States (1892) 146 U. S. 325.
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mon law was in force in Kansas at the time of its admission is
not stated, though it may be assumed.
A co-indictee, not on trial, was received as a witness for
the prosecution. . The defendant insisted that the co-indictee was
incompetent at common law and relied on the Reid case in support of that proposition. The court found that there was a conflict of opinion as to the common law rule, and that a difference
had been taken between the competency of a co-indictee as a
witness for the prosecution and as a witness for the defense:
"The precise question in that case (United States v. Reid) was as
to the right of the defendant to call his co-defendant, and not that of
the governmerit to call the co-defendant, and a distinction has been
recognized between the two cases. It is true that the reasons given for
the exclusion of the witness in one are largely the same as those given
for his exclusion in the other.

.

.

.

It was assumed both in this

court and in the circuit court that by that law (the common law in Vir-

ginia) the co-defendant was incompetent.

.

.

. We do not feel our-

selves, therefore, precluded by that case from examining the question in
the light of general authority and sound reason.

.

.

. The last fifty

years have wrought a great change in these respects, and today the
tendency is to enlarge the domain of competency."

The court accordingly held the witness competent for the
prosecution as a matter -of common law. It is obvious that the
Benson case throws no light on the problem in hand, though it
may throw doubt on the assumption made in the Reid case that the
common law disqualified a co-indictee as a witness for the defence.
It also doubtless implied that the development of the common law
did not stop in 1789.
In 1910 the Hendrix case' came before the court to review
a ruling of a federal court sitting in the State of Oklahoma, excluding the wife of the defendant as a witness on his behalf.
This ruling was affirmed with the :brief statement. that it
was clearly correct, presumably on the ground that the subsequent
qualifying statute of Oklahoma -was inapplicable. There was no
discussion as to what the law of Oklahoma was at the time of its
admission.
The next was the Rosen case 14 in which the United States district court for the eastern district of New York admitted as a competent witness for the government a person who had been convicted of a felony by a state court in New York and sentenced
to the state reformatory.
It was insisted by the defendant that the witness was incompetent because that was the rule of the common law in force
in New York in 1789. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Clarke the
court announced that the Reid case had been shaken by the Benson
13. Hendrix v. United States (1910) 219 U. S. 79.
14. Royen v. Vnited states (1920) 245 U. S. 467.
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case and that the question was to be decided in the light of sound
reason and authority:
"While the decision in United States v. Reid supra, has not been
specifically overruled, its authority must be regarded as seriously shaken
by the decisions in Logan v. United States 144 U. S. 263-301, and in
Benson v. United States 146 U. S. 325.

.

.

.

Accepting as we do the

later, the Benson case, rather than that of the earlier decision, we shall
dispose of the first question in this case, 'in the light of general authority and sound reason.' . . . Since the decision in the Benson case
we have significant evidence of congressional opinion upon this subject
in the removal of the disability of witnesses convicted of perjury,
revised statutes, sec. 5392, by the enactment of the federal criminal
code in 1909 with this provision omitted and sec. 5392 repealed...
"Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight
of judicial authority which has developed in support of this modern
rule, especially as applied to the competency of witnesses convicted of
crime, proceed upon sound principle, we conclude that the dead hand of
the common law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases
as we have here, and that the ruling of the lower courts on this first
claim of error should be approved."
These extraordinary statements certainly do not clarify the
law, or throw any light on the uniformity problem. If, as the unnecessarily discredited Reid case declared, the judiciary act impliedly adopted the existing common law in 1789, that would not
so crystallize it as to exclude subsequent judicial modification and
development. Many of the states have by statute adopted the common law, but it has continued to grow and change in its new environment. Whether the court correctly decided the common law
problem of the competency of a convicted felon is beyond the
scope of this inquiry. The witness might well have been held
competent on the ground that the conviction of a person by the
courts of one sovereignty did not disqualify in the courts of another. The Logan case so held in the case of a witness convicted
in another state, and a circuit court of appeals has sustained the
competency of a witness convicted by a court of the state in which
the federal court sat.1
At all events the Rosen case throws no light on the effect
of qualifying legislation in a particular state at the time of its
admission, where admittedly a different rule is applied by the federal
courts in other localities. The last case' 6 came before the court
in 1920 to review the action of the United States district court
for the western district of Pennsylvania in excluding the wife of
the defendant as a witness in his behalf.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney the ruling was sustained
on this statement:
"But a single point remains-hardly requiring mention-the refusal
to permit the defendant's wife to testify in his behalf. It is conceded
15. Brown v. United States (1916) 233 Fed. 353, L. R. A. 1917-A, 1133,
annotated.
16. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States (1920) 254 U. S. 189.
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that she was not a competent witness for all purposes, a wife's evidence not having been admissible at the time of the first judiciary act,
and the relaxation of the rule in this regard by sec. 858, revised statutes,
being confined to civil actions. Logan v. United States 144 U. S. 263,
299-302; Hendrix v. United States 219 U. S. 79, 91."
So far as the writer has been able to discover there are no
other decisions by the Supreme Court that have any bearing on
the problem in hand. If some of the language of the opinion in
the Reid case is taken out of its setting, we have an apparently
clear statement that the law of the state in 1789 is to govern in
cases tried in one of the original states. And there is undoubtedly
an implication in the Logan case that the law of Texas at the time
of its admission was to govern in criminal prosecutions in the
federal courts sitting in that state. There is also an apparent
analogy-in the one case the law of Virginia when the. judiciary
act took effect, and in the other the law of Texas when the judiciary
act took effect there by its admission as a state. But it is improbable that the opinion in the Reid case meant
the law of Virginia as distinguished from the law of the other
states. In fact it is improbable that there were any substantial
differences in the rules of evidence in criminal cases in the several
states in 1789, and the Supreme Court clearly was not thinking
about possible differences.
When the court speaks of the only known rules which the
framers of the judiciary act could have had in mind as those in
force in the respective -states and which they were accustomed
to see applied in daily practice, it would rather seem that the
court was thinking of a body of rules common to all the states
and which was to be applied uniformly by all the federal courts.
At least the language is quite as susceptible of that construction
as any other.
On this theory the witnesses were competent in the Logan
case, not because of the accidental fact that the Republic of Texas
had adopted the common law, but because, they were competent
by the common law impliedly adopted by the judiciary act for all
federal courts.
If the judiciary act is to be construed as impliedly adopting
the common law of the states and, excluding subsequent state
legislation, because Congress was presumably familiar with the
existing common law, it involves a curious inconsistency to construe the same act as impliedly adopting subsequent territorial
legislation when the territory should at some future time be admitted to statehood. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court
will soon have an opportunity to settle this vexed question.
E. W. HIINTON.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY OF REMEDY.- [Federal]
"What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance
that the decree, if rendered, will operate without- injustice or op-

